Tanner Regan (George Washington University)
Priya Manwaring (University of Oxford)
Abstract: Public disclosure of tax behavior is a promising policy tool for raising tax compliance in low-income countries with limited capacity for alternative enforcement mechanisms. Through a field experiment involving over 65,000 taxpayers in Kampala, we study effects of reporting delinquents and recognizing compliers and provide evidence on the social determinants of tax compliance. The threat of publicly disclosing delinquency raises compliance, but subsequently disseminating delinquent behavior lowers compliance of others. Public recognition backfires, lowering compliance both for those promised recognition and for those who receive information about compliant taxpayers. These results are consistent with a model of tax evasion with privacy costs to tax eligibility status and limited shame of delinquency. Disseminating tax behavior reduces compliance by lowering compliance beliefs as measured in survey data. Overall, public disclosure policies in this context are limited at raising revenue and enforcement reminder nudges more effective.
JEL Codes: O18, H30, H26
Key Words: property tax, tax morale, public disclosure, shaming